Abstract-The cognitive sciences are increasingly coming to terms with the embodied, embedded, extended, and experiential aspects of the mind. Exemplifying this shift, the enactive approach points to an essential role of goal-directed bodily activity in the generation of meaningful perceptual experience, i.e., sense-making. Here, building on recent insights into the transformative effects of practical tooluse, we make use of the enactive approach in order to provide a definition of an enactive interface in terms of augmented sensemaking. We introduce such a custom-built interface, the Enactive Torch, and present a study of its experiential effects. The results demonstrate that the user experience is not adequately captured by any standardly assumed perceptual modality; rather, it is a new feeling that is mediated by the design of the device and shaped by the overall situation of the task. Taken together these findings show that there is much to be gained by synergies between engineering and the cognitive sciences in the creation of new experiencecentered technology. We suggest that the guiding principle should be the design of interfaces that serve as a transparent medium for augmenting our natural skills of interaction with the world, instead of requiring conscious attention to the interface as an opaque object in the world.
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INTRODUCTION
T HIS paper introduces a tool for the scientific study of perception, namely the Enactive Torch [24] . The Enactive Torch is a handheld device developed on the principles of an enactive approach to interface design, which places the idea of what it is like to be engaged in mediated action at the center of our thinking about technology. As McCarthy and Wright [35] argue, interface design should not be based around simple function for a purpose, but should incorporate constraints arising from histories of practice and previous experience, the values and goals of the user, and the social or institutional embedding of the activity. This perspective is strongly supported by anthropological studies of situated tool-use (e.g., [28] ).
In what follows we will complement McCarthy and Wright's perspective by outlining an enactive approach to interface design, contrasting it with a more mainstream "cognitivist" viewpoint (in this, our approach parallels other calls to move beyond a "rationalist" approach to technology such as [16] and [1] . In doing so we will emphasize the important synergies between the designing and building of tools and our understanding of the mind and perceptual consciousness. We highlight opportunities in both of these domains and introduce the Enactive Torch as a prototype of a tool that provides experimental purchase on these opportunities. In the final sections we outline a first study of the experience of using the Enactive Torch for a simple navigation task either with or without prior training, in which we assessed both behavioral performance and subjective reports about the nature of the experience. Though we did not find significant effects of training on either performance or subjective report, examining the experiential reports of the participants collectively does provide important new insights into enactive interface (EI) design.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
There is always an experience of what it is like to be engaged in technologically mediated action. This fact highlights the importance of accounting for the user's first-person perspective, their subjective point of view, when designing human-computer interfaces. A technological interface should give rise to a new way of interacting with the world. In other words, its aim is to provide a new way of interactively experiencing the world (or a particular portion of it), but where the technology itself is not a focal part of that experience-this is the notion of the interface disappearing or becoming "transparent" [50] . In this way the user can take full advantage of an existing corpus of perceptual and bodily skills, and the interface itself does not have to detract attention from the target of the interfacemediated action.
The concept of transparency is gaining increasing currency in cognitive neuroscience, where it is recognized that normal human consciousness is transparent in similar sense;
namely, that conscious perceptions do not include as contents the processes of their generation; rather, they appear as unmediated, direct presentations of the world and self (see, e.g., [39] ). However, in contrast to the transparency of brain activity, the transparency of tool-use is dependent on how we relate to the tool. A tool that becomes experientially transparent during active usage can still become opaque and explicitly present under other circumstances. This can happen, for instance, when it breaks or when we explicitly reflect upon its properties (see, e.g., [19, Chapter 4] ), commentary on Heidegger's phenomenology of tool-use.
In general, we can therefore distinguish two approaches to interface design according to how much attention is given to user experience, and in particular to the extent in which the tool is intended to be reflective-opaque or intuitive-transparent during usage.
Two Approaches to Interface Design
One approach to interface design, which we call the "cognitivist" approach, can be caricatured as focusing mainly on the computational properties of abstract information processing and rational inference. Such an approach aims to present factual information to the user in a high-bandwidth fashion, i.e., maximizing information content and information flow. This typically involves presenting the user with rule-based system and/or a highly detailed representation (e.g., [40] ). However, in doing so this approach risks breaking our natural interactive expertise and perceptual immediacy by interposing between perception and action a separate process of logical, rational, or computational activity on the side of the user [20] . The interface user in such a case is forced to shift their attention to the abstract output of the device and must reason about what this output means for the course of action (Fig. 1) , rather than being implicitly facilitated in directly perceiving what to do (Fig. 2) .
The "enactive" approach to cognitive science (e.g., [52] , [49] , [18] ) provides us with a suitable framework to address how technological interfaces can mediate our relationship with the world such that they can enhance our perceptual interactions (e.g., [48] , [25] , [50] ). An enactive approach considers the sensory "input" and motor "output" as two facets of the same process of generating meaning, i.e., of sense-making. Sense-making is the activity by which an autonomous and adaptive agent maintains a meaningful relationship with its environment [54] , [17] . It is emergent from the ways in which an agent's movements are not just random physical events, but are goal-directed actions. To qualify, movements must not be mere responses to stimuli, but must comprise acts that are performed to satisfy the needs and interests of the motivated agent [36] . The meaning in an interaction is directly related to the fact that we are skillfully acting in the world to achieve a goal. The enactive approach provides operational definitions for many of these notions, which are explored further in [22] .
Interface design that is geared toward expanding our range of possible interactions with the world by means of technological devices, and which is thereby reflecting the principles of enaction and sense-making, can therefore be referred to as augmented sense-making. The basis of augmented sense-making essentially consists in giving a person opportunities to create novel modes or modalities of perceptual interactions. On this view, a perceptual modality is understood as the skillful negotiation of a specific relationship with the environment that allows a certain class of aspects of the world to meaningfully appear directly in the subject's experience ( [37] see also [4] ).
Figs. 1 and 2 show in schematic form the fundamental distinction between these "cognitivist" and "enactive" approaches to interface design. Although we chose to highlight important differences between these two approaches for didactical purposes, their associated user experiences may in fact be more accurately conceived of as two extremes of a continuum. Thus, "cognitivist" interfaces may also start to become experientially transparent with extensive practice and familiarity, while "enactive" interfaces can become experientially opaque because of breakdowns or reflective intent and may also require some familiarization before full immersion is achieved.
Transformative Tools
A cognitivist theory of mind sees cognition as information processing encapsulated in the brain. In such a view, tools Fig. 1 . Illustration of the "cognitivist" conception of interface design. A cognitive agent (represented as a box drawn around a sequence of "sense," "think," and "act" modules) is providing input to an interface, which in turn provides the user's sensory module with new input. On this view, the user engages with the interface as an opaque object in the environment at the expense of occluding the rest of the world. Fig. 2 . Illustration of the "enactive" approach to tool-use and interface design (based on a figure in [22] ). An agent is an autonomous system (self-constitution circle) that is embedded in a continuous sensorimotor loop (solid arrows), which is regulated in a goal-directed manner (dotted arrows). On this view, the use of an interface (transparent box) mediates the agent's goal-directed regulation and sensorimotor interaction. The interface can therefore directly and implicitly shape the user's perceptual activity without occluding the environment.
and technological interfaces are conceived as external to the core of cognition, merely providing extra data to existing information processing routines. This received view has faced strong criticisms in the past decade from alternative approaches in cognitive science, especially in the context of the "extended mind" hypothesis (e.g., [13] , [14] ). The basic idea motivating these criticisms is that cognition is a relational process that may be distributed across brain, body, and world, and that body-world interfaces (or brain-world interfaces) can therefore be part of the cognitive process itself.
The enactive approach also subscribes to such a relational view of cognition [17] . The focus has been on the biological embodiment of an agent, on how such an agent maintains a meaningful relationship with its environment, as well as on the various characteristics of first-person experience (see [49] ). On this view, anything that plays a significant role in the goal-directed regulation of that relationship becomes an inherent part of the overall sensemaking process. An enactive approach implies that tools do not just add external input to the cognitive process; rather, they transform the cognitive processes as such (e.g., [47] , [29] , [27] ). Of course, it is still possible for the user to abstractly reflect about how to use a tool, thereby turning it from a transparent medium into an opaque object in the world. But this detached stance should not be seen as the primary manner of instrumental actions.
The general hypothesis is therefore that goal-directed use of any artifact also mediates the perceptual interaction between the user and their world in some way, and tool-use therefore entails a modulation of the user's lived experience. In the next section we will flesh out this hypothesis with reference to empirical evidence about several kinds of transformative effects of tool use.
THE SCIENCE OF TOOL-USE
Developments in the neuroscience and psychology of practical tool-use (see, e.g., [34] ) support the notion that tools are not just another part of our environment. They do not simply add to our existing knowledge base or set of possible actions, but transform our bodily ways of acting and perceiving on many levels.
1. There are effects measurable in terms of neurological differences, for instance in terms of an alteration of neural activity in receptive fields (e.g., [30] ). 2. There are behavioral differences such that subsequent nontool actions become modulated (e.g., [12] ). 3. Tool-use leads to experiential differences. For example, it has been shown that the use of an extended "grabber" can lead to changes in the sense of embodiment, such that participants perceived touches delivered on the elbow and middle fingertip of their arm as if they were farther apart ( [12] ). 4. Finally, and most importantly for our current purposes, tool-use can specifically lead to perceptual differences as well, and it is on this area that we will focus here.
Transformation of Perceptual Experience
A striking example of the transformation of perceptual experience by tool-use is provided by experiments examining how tool-use modulates perception of near versus far space. Longo and Lourenco [33] tested healthy participants on a line bisection task at four distances. When a laser pointer was used, a left to right shift in bias was observed as stimuli were moved from near to far space. However, when a stick was used, a leftward bias was observed at all distances, similar to that observed with the laser pointer in near space. Using the extension tool therefore appears to change the status of space from far to near. In another study, a participant with a right hemisphere stroke showed perceptual neglect in near space but not in far space during a similar line bisection task when using a laser pointer, but also showed neglect in far space when the task was performed with a stick [9] . This finding further supports the idea that use of an extended tool transforms a person's far space into near space. Witt et al. [55] investigated the effect of tool-use on perceived distances by manipulating reachability with an elongated tool and asking participants for estimates of target distance. They showed that for tool-holding participants the perceived distances to targets, which were beyond normal reach but within reach with the tool, were experienced as compressed when compared to the estimates of control participants. This suggests that tool-based behavioral transformation of far space to near space is accompanied by a complementary change in perceptual experience as well. These transformative effects are naturally accommodated by the enactive approach to perception, but are difficult to account for by a cognitivist or information processing approach.
Further support for the enactive approach can be found when looking at the conditions under which these changes occur. Witt et al. [55] found that reachability only influenced perceived distance when the perceiver actually intended to reach, and they therefore suggest, in a manner akin to Gibson's notion of affordances, that we perceive the environment in terms of our intentions and abilities to act within it. This study therefore suggests that our felt potential for goal-directed embodied action incorporates the affordances of the tools. Similarly, Farnè et al. [21] , showed that these kinds of plastic changes critically depend upon previous active tool use; they are not found after passive exposure to hand-tool body configuration. Moreover, they demonstrated that the extent of near hand space elongation after tool-use is tightly related to the operationally effective length of the tool, and not simply to its absolute length. Operational effectiveness is a relational phenomenon that is dependent on how the agent is able to engage with its environment. In other words, we can only understand the transformative effects of tool-use when, like in the case of embodied action more generally, tool-use is conceived in the context of a goal-directed activity spanning brain, body, and world.
Enactive Interfaces
Let us now consider a set of tools that were specifically designed to enhance or modify the user's perceptual experience, which includes so-called "sensory-substitution" devices. The most famous example of these is Bach-y-Rita's TVSS ("tactile-visual substitution system"), which is a human-computer interface that provided tactile feedback through stimulation on the abdomen, back or thigh based on information received through a head-mounted camera.
When blindfolded or blind users became sufficiently practiced with the device they reported experiences of objects at a distance from themselves, and of experiencing the world in front of them rather than only experiencing the vibrations on their skin [7] . The observation that active regulation of the camera seems to be required to induce this shift in perceptual experience is often cited in support of an enactive approach to perception (e.g., [41] ), and it fits well with what is known about the effects of tool-use in general.
There is still little agreement among cognitive scientists about precisely what the experience of using TVSS is like [24] . This is partly due to a lack of detailed analysis of the TVSS-user experience itself (but see [26] ), and perhaps also because of lingering confusions about the nature of perceptual modalities ( [4] , [37] ). Thus, according to Bach-y-Rita, what TVSS does is to substitute one source of sensory input (visual stimulation) with another source of sensory input (tactile stimulation), while ensuring that the latter provides the right kind of information required by the brain's visual system. And, indeed, the idea that the experience of TVSSuse is like vision is supported by evidence for similar perceptual effects, e.g., occlusion and parallax, as well as by verbal reports of some of the participants. In addition, a recent study by Ward and Meijer [53] into the long-term effects of using a related visual-to-sound substitution system the "vOICe," see [38] in blind users has provided strong indications that visual-like experiences are in fact made possible by these kinds of interfaces see also [44] .
From an enactive perspective, though, the concept of sensory substitution is by itself inadequate [31] , [4] . We have already argued that in the general case of tool-use there is a transformation of the agent's relation with the world (with concomitant neural, behavioral, perceptual, and experiential changes). It would therefore be more appropriate to speak of "sensory augmentation" of existing perceptual skills instead of "sensory substitution" per se. Furthermore, by the lights of enaction, using such a system not only transforms the sensory aspects of a user's embodiment, but the potential for action as well, suggesting the term "sensorimotor augmentation." Finally, given that sensorimotor augmentation opens up new kinds of experiences for the user, we need to take into account the firstperson perspective as well. This is, as we have suggested, augmented sense-making.
Using the enactive framework for thinking about perception, action, and the design of interface technology we can now concisely define an enactive interface as follows: an enactive interface is a technological interface that is designed for the purpose of augmented sense-making. We see an EI as any piece of technology that is designed to permit its user to engage in additional modes of sense-making by enabling the goal-directed regulation of previously unavailable sensorimotor contingencies. Note that we have tried to draw a distinction between tools that improve the functioning of already existing modalities, such as the use of spectacles by a nearsighted person, and tools that give rise to the presence of new modalities, such as the use of TVSS by a blind person. In contrast to technological devices in general, the use of an EI enables the participant to generate and make sense of qualitatively new forms of sensorimotor regularities (e.g., in the case of TVSS, appreciating the meaning of the changes in the patterns of tactile stimulation in relation to moving the camera within the environment), although in practice the difference is not an absolute one.
There are already many tools and devices that satisfy this definition of an EI. A well-known example is the blind person's cane, in which the tactile modality is augmented so as to incorporate a distal aspect that is characteristic of vision. The advent of computer technology has vastly expanded our capabilities of designing such interfaces. Sensory substitution systems, haptic interfaces, prosthetic and assistive devices, virtual reality systems, and everyday human-computer interfaces in general, are all accelerating fields of research.
Nevertheless, not every technological interface created by these fields should be immediately considered as an EI. Some user interfaces inadvertently create an unwanted competition of attention between the demands of the artifact and the user's perception of rest of the world, as shown, for example, by problems caused by drivers who look too frequently at their navigational system at the expense of being aware of road signs and other environmental cues. In the case of assistive technology, the experience of the user can be impaired by cumbersome hardware and informationally demanding computer interfaces (e.g., [40] ), by direct interference with other organic perceptual modalities (e.g., audition in the case of the vOIce [38] ), and by hinderance of social function (e.g., speech in the case of the BrainPort device, [8] ). Such unwanted competition with conscious attention and interference of perceptual experience may be one reason why many blind people prefer canes and guide dogs, rather than high-tech gadgetry.
We will not enter further into issues specifically regarding assistive technology here (the interested reader is referred to the discussion of sensory substitution by Lenay et al. [31] ). We merely want to emphasize the general point that, in contrast to some of these examples, when an EI is used the device itself, like a blind person's cane, should become transparent in relation to the augmented perceptual experience of the world. Thus, one could also say that the goal of designing an EI is to create a medium for facilitating new modes of perception, rather than to create an object that is the target of an existing mode of perception.
Enactive Torch: A Minimal Enactive Interface
Here, we introduce a minimal example of an EI, the Enactive Torch ET; see [24] . Previous work in this area has already shown the value of using minimal technological interfaces in the science of perception (e.g., [32] , [5] , [2] . The ET is an original contribution to this domain.
The first ET design was inspired by another haptic interface, the Haptic Torch, which translates ultrasonic distance readings into rotary tactile output, and which was designed by Spiers as a hand-held navigational aid for visually impaired people [46] . The notion of the "Torch" derives from the fact that the Haptic Torch is intended to be a torch (flashlight) for the blind. Indeed, the Haptic Torch was originally built into the plastic case of a normal hand-held torch.
The current iteration of the ET, designed by W. Bigge in collaboration with T. Froese and A.K. Seth, includes an exchangeable sensor module such that a range of possible measures can be taken. Different kinds of sensor modules might, for example, detect distance, luminescence, temperature, humidity, or other environmental features. In the study described in the next section we made use of an infrared distance sensor module. The ET outputs to a vibrational motor, which in this version can be worn on a Velcro wristband that can be placed around the wrist or arm (see Fig. 3 ). The motor coil voltage is controlled by the pulse width duty cycle (PWM), which is currently set to be inversely proportional to distance measured. Larger coil voltages result in faster motor movement and more intense vibrations. The device is set to be sensitive across a continuous range of distances, but limited to a range of about 0.1 to 1m. The particular input-output response profiles of the ET are programmable (e.g., the most minimalist setup would be an all-or-nothing response profile), and the device can accommodate other forms of output. For instance, the output could be routed to the vibrations of a speaker, and the ET could then work like a car parking sensor: the closer things get, the faster it beeps.
We decided to make use of a continuous inverse mapping between distance and tactile vibration intensity, because this response profile had been shown to be effective during many informal demonstration sessions. The continuous haptic feedback is likely more intuitive than an all-ornothing response, while at the same time encouraging the user to engage in active exploration. The sensor does not provide the user with a prefabricated representation of the environment. It only provides a single measure of distance. Accordingly, the epistemic shift from receiving an isolated stimulus of distance to determining an object's position in 3D space, as well as the shift from determining an object's position in space to recognizing its identity, must be actively supported by the user's movements [32] .
In terms of data flow, the device can transmit information (over Bluetooth) and store readings from the sensor, actuator, and the on-board accelerometer. These readings may also be played back through the ET, which can be a useful capacity for certain control conditions that aim to disrupt the user's sensorimotor loop.
Our objective is to make the ET research platform easily available in an open-source manner to anyone who is interested in using it for noncommercial purposes as long as they cite this paper, and as long as they ensure that any subsequent modifications of the device are similarly openly accessible to others. For this reason we have licensed the ET with Creative Commons, in particular under the AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0) license. In addition, we have already distributed ETs to a number of research centers internationally (in Europe and Japan), and we are in the process of establishing an Enactive Interface Consortium (EIC). The goal of the EIC is to promote the development and distribution of the ET research platform, as well as other technology that implements the design principles of an EI, as we have defined it above. Given the ever-increasing ubiquity of human-computer interfaces, an important goal of the EIC will be to make scientific knowledge about EIs available, and thereby to support practices of engineering experience that reveal more of the world rather than occluding it behind an interface.
WHAT IS IT LIKE TO USE THE ENACTIVE TORCH? A FIRST CASE STUDY
We next present some results of a study of what it is like to use the ET in order to navigate through a novel environment (a simple maze) without the help of normal vision. We compared groups with and without prior training, and assessed both behavioral performance and subjective experiential reports. Analysis of the behavioral performance did not yield strong conclusions. However, analysis of the qualitative survey of user experience supports predictions of the enactive approach to some extent, but they also reveal the need for further research.
Participants
Participants were 22 undergraduate and postgraduate students of Mary Immaculate College, Limerick. Eleven were assigned to a training group, who received two sessions of practice with the ET (described below) prior to completing the navigation task. The other 11 participants only took part in the testing session. We hypothesized that for the training group the ET would become more bodily incorporated, and therefore more experientially transparent. Participation in both training and testing sessions was entirely voluntary. Conduct of the study was approved by the MIC Research Ethics Committee. Informed consent was obtained from all participants and all data collection was conducted in accordance with the Psychological Society of Ireland's Code of Ethics [45] .
Training
All participants were given a brief introduction to the Enactive Torch, which included a very short description of how it worked, and a few minutes to use the device freely to become comfortable with it. 1 Half of the participants
FROESE ET AL.: THE ENACTIVE TORCH: A NEW TOOL FOR THE SCIENCE OF PERCEPTION 369
Fig . 3 . The Enactive Torch with infrared sensor mounting and vibrational motor attached to a Velcro wristband. The front sensor unit is modular and replaceable. The function of the button can be programmed, for example, to switch between response profiles or to begin and end the transmission of data. All electronics are inside the device.
It is an interesting question if this introduction of the ET as a distanceto-vibration transformation device to the participants is strictly necessary.
Studies with other equally minimalist devices have shown that what is crucial for the experience of space to emerge is that participants' actions with the device must be interpretable in terms of a displacement [5] , which is also the case for the ET.
completed only the testing session, and received this introduction at the commencement of that session. The other half of the participants additionally received two identical training sessions before the testing phase. In each of these sessions participants engaged in two sets of training tasks, 1) object recognition and 2) maze navigation. They were blindfolded throughout the two tasks, in both training and testing phases.
Object recognition was not directly relevant to the task of maze navigation, but it was included in order to add some variation to the training procedure (a greater range of activities could be explored by users) and to keep the participants engaged. This task involved using only the ET to explore four objects placed one at a time on a classroom table (e.g., a plastic bottle, a textbook, a football, a box). Participants had to point at the object with their free hand (i.e., the nondominant hand, which was not holding the ET), then describe it aloud in as much detail as possible (they were given as much times as they wished). Finally, they had to pick the object up as smoothly as possible. This object recognition procedure, which is typical of research with sensory substitution systems (e.g., [3] ), gave the participants the opportunity to acquire an idea of the possibilities offered by the device and to familiarize themselves with its operation. Though they were encouraged to explore the range of possible motions, they were not given any explicit instruction on how to use the device.
Performance on the object recognition task was not central to the study being reported, but it is worth noting that participants generally performed very well. Typically, during their second training session, they were able to recognize the objects they were dealing with and name them based on their previous experience.
Training in the navigation task involved walking through a very simple maze. The maze was formed in a rectangular classroom from an arrangement of chairs with their backs facing the pathway (see Fig. 4 ). The use of waist-high objects limited potential cues available to the participant from differences in general luminance and variations in acoustics of blocked versus open spaces. It also provided something of a challenge to participants in the use of the ET, in that the natural position of holding the ET could drift above the level of the obstacles, so that without careful use the contours of the maze edge could be lost and would have to be refound. The training maze, a crooked line from one side of the room to the other, was approximately 5 meters in length and involved two sharp left turns and two sharp right turns.
Participants were trained according to the series of tasks rather than to a particular length of time, though each of the two sessions tended to be approximately 40-45 minutes long. All trained participants had therefore completed the same set of tasks the same number of times after training, over time periods that were at least 1 hour and up to 2 hours in duration.
Testing: Navigation Task
Materials. The same model of the ET, using infrared sensors for distance and increasing vibrational intensity to indicate proximity to objects, was used in all tasks. An irregular rectangular maze was arranged of approximately 14 meters in length using the same materials as used for the navigation training. The beginning and the end of the maze were placed on the same side of the room so that participants could easily find their way back to the beginning of the maze again.
Procedure. Both trained and untrained groups completed the same testing procedure. Participants were fitted with the ET into their preferred (dominant) hand and blindfolded. They were then placed at the starting position of the maze (which they had not previously seen). They were told that they would be given 5 minutes during which they should complete the maze as many times as they could, but in doing so that they should avoid bumping into anything. They were also instructed that each time they would complete the maze they would be told that they had done so, and that they should then try to complete the maze once more from the beginning. In this way the experimenter ensured that participants would not accidentally exit the maze completely during the task.
Bumps were recorded when either the participant's body or the ET came in contact with the maze edges. Each completion of the maze was also recorded. After the defined period of 5 minutes participants were instructed to stop and remove their blindfold. They then completed a short questionnaire about their experience of using the ET during the maze navigation task.
Navigation Results I: Behavioral Performance
The navigation task that participants performed was an exercise in minimalism. Although the maze was relatively simple, the manner in which the participants could interact and regulate their relationship with this environment was highly constrained-through the single channel of vibratory feedback from the ET. Participants therefore found the task to be somewhat challenging, but nevertheless almost all performed very well, with just one participant not managing to complete the maze at least once. The number of completions ranged from 0 to 6, with a modal and median completion rate of 5 (see Fig. 5, left-hand panel) . The number of collisions varied considerably, with a range of 9 to 50 and a median of 21.
A Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to ascertain whether training had any effect on the number of times the maze was completed. No significant difference was found between the trained and untrained groups on the number of completions (p ¼ 0:58). In order to assess the differences in overall performance between trained and untrained groups a "maze score" was calculated for each participant by dividing the number of collisions by the number of completions of the maze; low values reflect good performance. A MannWhitney U was conducted on the maze score values, again showing no significant differences between trained and untrained groups (p ¼ 0:715). These results are illustrated in Fig. 5 , right-hand panel. Taken together, the behavioral results do not allow any strong conclusions on the effect of the limited training with respect to performance on the navigation task. Nevertheless, we note that the success of the completely untrained group of participants is remarkable, especially considering the extensive training typically required by other sensory substitution interfaces.
Navigation Results II: User Experience
Immediately after completion of the task, a 15-item questionnaire was used to sample participants' experience of using the ET for navigation. The questionnaire consisted of 14 statements to which the participants responded on a five-point Likert scale, from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree. See Table 1 for the full questionnaire and a summary of the results.
First, there were no notable differences in the reported experiences between trained and untrained participants, which corresponds to the lack of behavioral differences in the maze navigation task. A series of Mann-Whitney comparisons were carried out to examine the responses of trained and untrained users. Only statement LI-11, "I felt 
TABLE 1 Results of Participant Experience Questionnaire
List of statements of the qualitative questionnaire examining the participants' experience of using the Enactive Torch in a navigation task. Questions LI-1, LI-2, and LI-14 establish the extent of the experiential transparency of the device; questions LI-3, LI-4, and LI-5 determine the amount of reflective control and cognition; questions LI-7 and LI-8 assess the sense modality of the user experience, while question LI-6 allows a more neutral response that does not necessarily commit the experience to a specific sense organ; questions LI-9 and LI-10 query the experiential relationship between the user's technologicaly enhanced embodiment and the environment; questions LI-11 and LI-13 asked about the device's general usability.
that I could rely on the device," of the 14 Likert items showed a significant difference (p ¼ 0:038, uncorrected). It is not clear why the two training sessions had no significant effect on the other items of the questionnaire. It is possible that the device is sufficiently intuitive to use even without extensive training, such that the effects of a relatively short period of training are not very evident. Significant differences between groups may become apparent after much longer periods of practice, but this is a question for future research. The discussion that follows is therefore based on the participants as a single whole group.
In addition, as the numbers indicated that the responses in terms of Strong Agreement or Strong Disagreement on any given item tended to be relatively low, we will collapse the categories to simply discuss the results in terms of general agreement (GA), general disagreement (GD), and undecided (UD).
Reponses to the questionnaire indicate that users found the device intuitive. Overall, most of the 22 participants agreed with the statement "I found the device intuitive to use" (LI-13; GA 15). And yet, unexpectedly, there were still high levels of explicit and deliberate thinking involved in the ET's use for the navigation task. Almost all agreed that they "had to deliberately analyze the feedback" (LI-5; GA 19), that they "deliberately controlled [their] pointing with the device to calculate the optimum path" (LI-3; GA 15), and that they "had to explicitly think about how to move the device in order to find [their] way" (LI-4; GA 15). From the current perspective of the enactive approach to perception, this pervasive deliberate reflection about how to use the device is rather surprising inasmuch as it appears more consonant with a cognitive approach. Future research could investigate whether the device becomes more transparent after longer periods of familiarization and training. We will return to this issue in the discussion below.
Interestingly, there were also high levels of agreement with all of the questions concerning the participants' focus of attention. In the ideal case of fluent use, we might imagine the device to become transparent, and that the participants' focus of attention would therefore be directed only at the objects in the world around them. And, as expected, the majority of participants indicated that they "experienced [their] focus of attention mainly on the obstacles perceived in front" (LI-2; GA 16). In other words, although the ET itself only provides tactile sensations that are localized to the hand and without any intrinsic spatial information (there is only change of vibrational intensity over time), usage of the ET seems to have given rise to a spatial experience in some cases. However, it appears that most of the participants were also mainly focused on the vibrations on their wrist (LI-1; GA 20), and many of them also "paid attention to the sound of the motors in order to find [their] way" (LI-14; GA 15). 2 This would seem to suggest that, in addition to having had an experience of external obstacles, most of the participants still retained some awareness of aspects pertaining to the functioning of the device itself.
We now turn to the intriguing question of the user experience: what is it like to navigate through the maze by using the ET? It turns out that there was general disagreement with the statement that using the device was like "seeing" (LI-8; GD 15) , and yet at the same time there was a general agreement that they "experienced the contours of the maze out in the world at a distance from [their] hands" (LI-9; GA 15). Moreover, participants were divided on whether this experience was like "touching" (LI-7; GA 8, UD 4, GD 10), and only a few agreed that it felt like their arm itself had become extended (LI-10; GA 5, UD 8, GD 9), while the majority of participants preferred the more neutral description "feeling" (LI-6; GA 16).
DISCUSSION OF QUALITATIVE RESULTS
The questionnaire results indicate that, in most cases, trained and untrained use of the ET in the maze navigation task led to an experience of objects located at a distance in the world (see . And yet at the same time some of the other responses show that this experience of spatiality cannot be characterized in any straightforward manner. Accordingly, several aspects of these results deserve further discussion.
First, contrary to our expectation of finding high levels of experiential transparency, it was found that the general user experience was accompanied by some awareness of aspects pertaining to the functioning of the device itself (tactile and auditory feedback). However, it remains possible that these nontransparent aspects of the experience were outside the focus of attention or were present only at certain temporal stages during the evolution of the experience as the task progressed. Since the navigation task was relatively short, it is possible that there was not sufficient time for participants to become habituated to these aspects of the user experience. It may even have been the case that explicit awareness of these aspects began to disappear toward the end of the navigation task, as indicated by the fact that the majority of participants also agreed that obstacles had appeared to them at a distance in the world without their hand seeming to have become extended by the device. Unfortunately, our questionnaire was not designed to further probe these more subtle aspects of user experience. Future work could determine how the experiential transparency of the device changes over time, and whether transparency does in fact become more prevalent with longer usage times.
Second, and again prima facie in conflict with the enactive approach, we recorded a high level of explicit deliberation about the experience. A possible explanation for the presence of reflective cognition could be an artificially induced feeling of apprehension, i.e., the participants likely experienced some level of disorientation because of being blindfolded, and they may have been uneasy due to being in an experimental setting, and generally concerned about the use and reliability of a novel and rather unusual device. This kind of uncertainty could lead to explicit and careful reflection about how to employ the new space of sensorimotor interactions. Indeed, participants were divided 2. That the varying sounds of the vibration motor can be a factor in the experience of using the ET was first discovered in the context of an "Explicitation Interview" [42] about Froese's experience of using the ET. This anecdotal finding nicely demonstrates the opportunistic nature of our capacity for augmented sense-making, which in this case had spontaneously turned the ET into a multimodal EI. It also highlights the difficulties of trying to directly engineer the emergence of certain prespecified experiences through EI design, as well as the need for methods to better assess someone's experience see [23] . about whether they "felt that [they] could rely on the device" (LI-11; GA 9, UD 4, GD 9).
However, uncertainty about use and reliability is unlikely to be the whole story for two reasons at least. First, although those participants who had received training were significantly more likely to agree that they could rely on the device, there was no accompanying significant decrease in their overall amount of deliberation. Second, an explanation centered on uncertainty about use and reliability alone is not strongly supported by the fact that participants were equally divided about the statement that they "did not trust the device so [they] tried to compensate by thinking about how best to interpret the stimulations" (LI-12; GA 7; UD 7; GD 7). In other words, the elevated levels of deliberation were not primarily a compensatory response.
Given these considerations, the striking preoccupation with the ET itself as a perceptual object to be reflected upon and controlled, rather than serving as a transparent medium of perception, may also be partly explained by the fact that the given task only involved maze navigation as such. In other words, it was not a case of navigation in the service of solving some other task, a task that could have otherwise been the focus of their attention. We therefore hypothesize that such a navigation-dependent task would entail significantly lower levels of deliberation about the use of the device itself. One promising approach in this regard is to implicitly embed the navigational component of the task within the context of an interactive game (e.g., [10] ).
Third, the results do not indicate any straightforward characterization of the spatial experience in terms of traditional sensory modalities (in this case, vision or touch). Thus, in characterizing the experience associated with using the ET, and perhaps with forms of augmented sensemaking in general (see, e.g., [3] , [4] ), the standard distinctions between the set of organically based modalities may not be appropriate. Here, neither the inducing modality (touch), nor the induced modality (vision), appears to have constituted a significant part of the experience. Of course, ET-based perception is arguably quite distinct from vision: on one hand, distal perception is not a unique property of the visual modality (e.g., it is also characteristic of the auditory modality), and on the other, sensitivity to light and color, unique properties of vision, are both absent in the ET. And yet according to the standard view in perceptual psychology, which holds that sensory modalities are distinct organ-based categories, this line of reasoning would lead us to expect that the experience should instead be much more like the inducing modality. In other words, since participants use only their hands to sense the device's stimulation, the quality of their perceptual experience should only be determined by the sensations of the hand, i.e., touch. However, this traditional expectation is not strongly supported by the results (see LI-7).
It seems that the experience of using the ET does not lend itself to be captured by the trivial dichotomy between inducing and induced organic modality. This finding lends some support to an enactive approach to perception focused on the embodied process of meaning making, i.e., sense-making. Intriguingly, the fact that most participants preferred to describe the experience of using the ET as a form of "feeling" (LI-6) may not only derive from the term's association with the act of touching; it could also be related to the inherent emotional qualities of sense-making [15] . Future work could investigate more closely the precise experiential characteristics of this basic mode of interaction.
Considering the above issues together, our study can be seen to have replicated the prevailing confusion about what the experience of using Bach-y-Rita's TVSS is actually like. For instance, Noë [41, p. 27] claims that in the case of TVSS "it is reasonable to admit that the resulting experiences are, if not fully visual, then vision-like to some extent." Block [11, p. 286 ] on the contrary, argues that "there is doubt as to whether the phenomenology of TVSS is exclusively visual" and that "perhaps TVSS is a case of spatial perception via tactile sensation." And in contrast to both Noë and Block, Prinz [43, p. 5] prefers the view that such "prosthetic vision devices simply allow participants to make automatic inferences about where objects are located in space as a result of tactile information." Interestingly, there is some support for each of these competing positions in the results of the current study, and such mixed results have also been found in relation to studies of the vOIce sensory substitution device [3] .
In summary, the issues discussed point to the need for a dynamic, flexible, and integrated approach to perceptual experience. For example, we may question whether the strict and exclusive traditional demarcations between our different organic modalities and reflective capacities actually match our first-person experience, especially because, after all, we experience the world from an integrated point of view (see, e.g., [6] , [51] ). Conversely, the transformative effects of tool-use force us to consider that many different ways of perceiving the world are possible, and that the notion of a perceptual modality may actually be based on a relative stability of sense-making activities. The results of our study indicate that the enactive proposal that the use of technological interfaces gives rise to an additional and qualitatively new way of experiencing the world are on the right track (e.g., [31] , [4] . Nevertheless, the results have also revealed that the enactive approach still needs to better address the role of reflective thought in relation to its notion of sense-making, a need that has also been highlighted by other studies of the experience of sensory substitution (e.g., [3] ).
CONCLUSIONS
The enactive approach provides a novel framework for the understanding of human beings' use of technology, based on a distinctive understanding of the biological foundations of agency. It points to a new kind of engineering stance, the engineering of experience, in which the goal is no longer to design human-computer interfaces that are the objects of our perceptual interaction, but rather enactive interfaces that serve as implicit (transparent) media that enable their users to give rise to novel ways of experiencing the world.
We have introduced a prototypical enactive interface, the Enactive Torch, and presented a study of its experiential effects in a navigation task. The results of this study have shed light on some prevalent assumptions and presuppositions about perception, and have helped to position the enactive approach in relation to the current debates about prosthetic perception in the cognitive sciences. In particular, the results support the notion that enactive interfaces are able to generate qualitatively new forms of perceptual interaction with the environment (e.g., [31] , [48] , [4] ), and that our modalities of perception are more dynamically assembled than traditional thinking on perceptual modalities would have us believe (e.g., [37] , [32] ). An enactive approach to technology thus responds positively to the call made by McCarthy and Wright [35] for a more central consideration of lived experience in technology design.
